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Abstract. This paper presents a logic-based bargaining solution based
on Zhang and Zhang’s framework. It is shown that if the demand sets of
players are logically closed, the solution satisﬁes a ﬁxed-point property,
which says that the outcome of bargaining is the result of mutual belief
revision. The result is interesting not only because it presents a desirable
logical property of bargaining solution but also establishes a link between
bargaining theory and multi-agent belief revision.
1 Introduction
Negotiation or bargaining is a process of dispute resolution to reach mutually
beneﬁcial agreements. The studies of negotiation in game theory, known as bar-
gaining theory, initiated by John Nash’s path-breaking work [1], has reached a
high sophistication with a variety of models and solutions and has been exten-
sively applied to economics, sociology, management science, and politics [2,3,4].
The game-theoretical model of bargaining is purely numerical. Although the
numerical theory of bargaining provides “a ‘clear-cut’ numerical predication for
a wide range of bargaining problems”, it does not help us to understand how
disputes are resolved through a bargaining process ([5] p.81-88).
In recent years, the AI researchers try to rebuild the theory of bargaining
and negotiation in order to model logical reasoning behind a bargaining process.
Kraus et al. introduced a logical model of negotiation based on argumentation
theory [6,7]. Unlike game theory, the model allows explicit representation of ne-
gotiation items, promises, threats and arguments. More importantly, bargaining
process can be embedded into logic-based multi-agent systems so that negotia-
tion becomes a component of agent planning. Similar to Rubinstein’s strategic
model of bargaining, the argumentation-based approach views bargaining as a
non-cooperative game. Zhang et al. introduced a logical model of negotiation
based on belief revision theory [8,9,10]. Diﬀerent from the argumentation-based
framework, the belief-revision-based approach takes a cooperative view. In order
to reach an agreement, each player tries to persuade the other player to accept
her demands or beliefs. Anyone who is convinced to accept the other player’s
demands will need to conduct a course of belief revision. It was assumed that
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any possible outcome of negotiation, (Ψ1,Ψ 2), should satisﬁes the following ﬁxed-
point condition [11], which says that the outcome of negotiation is the common
demands or beliefs after mutual belief revision:
Cn(Ψ1 ∪ Ψ2)=( Cn(X1) ⊗1 Ψ2) ∩ (Cn(X2) ⊗2 Ψ1)
where Xi contains the demands of agent i and ⊗i is the belief revision operator
of agent i. However, there is no justiﬁcation for the assumption. This paper aims
to build a concrete bargaining solution to satisfy the ﬁxed-point condition. The
construction of the solution is based on the bargaining model proposed by Zhang
and Zhang in [12,13]. The result of the paper not only shows the logical property
of bargaining but also establishes the link between bargaining and belief revision,
which may be helpful for the investigation of multi-agent belief revision.
2 Logical Model of Bargaining
Within this paper, we consider the bargaining situations with two players. We
assume that each party has a set of negotiation items, referred to as demand set,
described by a ﬁnite propositional language L. The language is that of classical
propositional logic with an associated consequence operation Cn in the sense
that Cn(X)={ϕ : X   ϕ},w h e r eX is a set of sentences. A set X of sentences
is logically closed or called a belief set when X = Cn(X). If X and Y are two
sets of sentences, X + Y denotes Cn(X ∪ Y ).
Suppose that X1 and X2 are the demand sets from two bargaining parties re-
spectively. To simplify exploration, we use X−i to represent the other set among
X1 and X2 if Xi is one of them. If D is a vector of two components, D1 and D2
will represent each of the components of D.
2.1 Bargaining Games
We will use the bargaining model introduced by Zhang and Zhang in [12] to
represent a bargaining situation.
Deﬁnition 1. [12] A bargaining game is a pair ((X1, 1),(X2, 2)),w h e r eXi
(i =1 ,2) is a logically consistent set of sentences in L and  i is a complete
transitive reﬂexive order (total preorder or weak order) over Xi which satisﬁes
the following logical constraints1:
(LC) If ϕ1,···,ϕ n   ψ, then there is k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) such that ψ  i ϕk.
1 A complete transitive reﬂexive order, i.e., total preorder or weak order, satisﬁes the
following properties:
– Completeness or totality: ϕ  ψ or ψ  ϕ.
– Reﬂexivity: ϕ  ϕ.
– Transitivity: if ϕ  ψ and ψ  χ then ϕ  χ.32 D. Zhang
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Fig.1. The hierarchy of a demand set
We call the pair (Xi, i) the prioritized demand set of player i. For any ϕ,ψ ∈
Xi, ψ   ϕ denotes that ψ  i ϕ and ϕ   i ψ. ψ ≈i ϕ denotes that ψ  i ϕ and
ϕ  i ψ.
Intuitively, a bargaining game is a formal representation of a bargaining situation
whereby each player describes his demands in logical formulae and expresses his
preferences over his demands in total preorder. We assume that each player has
consistent demands. The preference ordering of each player reﬂects the degree of
entrenchment in which the player defends his demands. The logical constraint
(LC) says that if ϕ1,···,ϕ n and ψ are all your demands and ϕ1,···,ϕ n   ψ,
then ψ should not be less entrenched than all the ϕi because if you fail to defend
ψ,a tl e a s to n eo ft h eϕi has to be dropped (otherwise you would not have lost
ψ). This indicates that the preference orderings are diﬀerent from players’ payoﬀ
or utility. For instance, suppose that p1 represents the demand of a seller “the
price of the good is no less than $10”a n dp2 denotes “the price of the good is
no less than $8”. Obviously the seller could get higher payoﬀ from p1 than p2.
However, since p1 implies p2, she will entrench p2 no less than p1, i.e., p2   p1,
because, if she fails to keep p1, she can still bargain for p2 but the loss of p2
means the loss of both.
Given a prioritized demand set (X, ), we deﬁne recursively a hierarchy,
{Xj}
+∞
j=1,o fX with respect to the ordering   as follows:
1. X1 = {ϕ ∈ X : ¬∃ψ ∈ X(ψ   ϕ)}; T 1 = X\X1.
2. Xj+1 = {ϕ ∈ T j : ¬∃ψ ∈ T j(ψ   ϕ)}; T j+1 = T j\Xj+1.
where ψ   ϕ denotes ψ   ϕ and ϕ    ψ. The intuition behind the construction
is that, at each stage of the construction, we collects all maximal elements from
the current demand set and remove them from the set for the next stage of the
construction. It is easy to see that there exists a number n such that X =
n 
j=1
Xj
due to the logical constraint LC2.
It is easy to see that for any ϕ ∈ Xj and ψ ∈ Xk, ϕ   ψ if and only if j<k .
In the sequel, we write X≤k to denote
k 
j=1
Xj.
2 Note that X can be an inﬁnite set even though the language is ﬁnite.A Fixed-Point Property of Logic-Based Bargaining Solution 33
Based on the hierarchy of each demand, we can deﬁne a belief revision function
for each agent by following Nebel’s idea of prioritized base revision [14]:
For any demand set (X, )a n das e t ,F, of sentences,
X ⊗ F
def
=

H∈X⇓F
(H + F),
where X ⇓ F is deﬁned as: H ∈ X ⇓ F if and only if
1. H ⊆ X,
2. for all k (k =1 ,2,···), H ∩Xk is a maximal subset of Xk such that
k 
j=1
(H ∩
Xj) ∪ F is consistent.
In other words, H is a maximal subset of X that is consistent with F and gives
priority to the higher ranked items. The following result will be used in Section 3.
Lemma 1. [14] If X is logically closed, then ⊗ satisﬁes all AGM postulates.
2.2 Possible Agreements
Similar to [12], we deﬁne a possible outcome of negotiation as a concession made
by two players.
Deﬁnition 2. Let G =( ( X1, 1),(X2, 2)) be a bargaining game. A deal of G
is a pair (D1,D 2) satisfying the following conditions: for each i =1 ,2,
1. Di ⊆ Xi;
2. X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ Di;
3. for each k (k =1 ,2,···), Di ∩ Xk
i is a maximal subset of Xk
i such that
k 
j=1
(Di ∩ X
j
i ) ∪ D−i is consistent.
where {X
j
i }
+∞
k=1 is the hierarchy of Xi. The set of all deals of G is denoted by
Ω(G), called the feasible set of the game.
Intuitively, a possible agreement is a pair of subsets of two players’ original de-
mand sets such that the collection of remaining demands is consistent. Obviously
each player would like to keep as many original demands as possible. Therefore,
if a player has to give up a demand, the player typically gives up the ones with
the lowest priority. Note that we require that no player gives up common de-
mands, which is crucial to the ﬁxed-point property. This is diﬀerent from Zhang
and Zhang’s deﬁnition in [12].
2.3 Bargaining Solution
We have shown how to generates all possible deals from a bargaining game.
However, a game might have multiple deals. Diﬀerent deals would be in favor of34 D. Zhang
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Fig.2. Diﬀerent deals are in favour of diﬀerent parties
diﬀerent parties. The major concern of a bargaining theory is how to measure
and balance the gain of each negotiating party.
Instead of counting the number of demands a deal contains for each party,
we consider the top block demands a player keeps in the deal (the top levels of
demands in each player’s demand hierarchy) and ignore all demands that are
not included in the top blocks except the common demands3.
Given a deal D, we shall use the maximal top levels of each player’s demands
the deal contains as the indicator of the player’s gain from the deal, i.e., max{k :
X
≤k
i ⊆ Di}. For instance, in Figure 2, player 1 can successfully remain maximally
top k +1 levels of his demands from deal D  while player 2 gains maximally top
k levels of his demands from the deal.
To compare players’ gains from diﬀerent deals, we use the gain of the player
with smaller gain from a deal as the index of the deal, i.e., min{max{k : X
≤k
1 ⊆
D1},max{k : X
≤k
2 ⊆ D2}},o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,m a x {k : X
≤k
1 ⊆ D1 and X
≤k
2 ⊆
D2}. For instance, in Figure 2, the gain index of D  is k while the gain index of
D   is k − 1. By using this index, we can collect all the best deals of a game:
γ(G) = arg max
(D1,D2)∈Ω(G)
{k : X
≤k
1 ⊆ D1 and X
≤k
2 ⊆ D2}
Based on the intuitive description, we are now ready to construct our bar-
gaining solution.
Deﬁnition 3. A bargaining solution is a function F which maps a bargaining
game G =( ( X1, 1),(X2, 2)) to a pair of sets of sentences deﬁned as follows:
F(G)
def
=(

(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1,

(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D2)( 1 )
where γ(G) = arg max
(D1,D2)∈Ω(G)
{k : X
≤k
1 ⊆ D1 and X
≤k
2 ⊆ D2}.
3 Note that common demands of two parties are always included in a deal no matter
how much priorities they have.A Fixed-Point Property of Logic-Based Bargaining Solution 35
Let
πG
max =m a x
(D1,D2)∈Ω(G)
{k : X
≤k
1 ⊆ D1 and X
≤k
2 ⊆ D2} (2)
and
(Φ1,Φ 2)=( X
≤π
G
max
1 ,X
≤π
G
max
2 )( 3 )
We call Φ =( Φ1,Φ 2)t h ecore of the game. Intuitively, the core of the game is
the pair of maximal top block demands that are contained in all the best deals.
To help the reader to understand our solution, let us consider the following
example.
Example 1. A couple are making their family budget for the next year. The
husband wants to change his car to a new fancy model and have a domestic
holiday. The wife is going to implement her dream of a romantic trip to Europe
and suggests to redecorate the kitchen. Both of them know that they can’t have
two holidays in one year. They also realize that they cannot aﬀord a new car
and an overseas holiday in the same year without getting a loan from the bank.
However, the wife does not like the idea of borrowing money.
In order to represent the situation in logic, let c denote “buy a new car”, d
stand for “domestic holiday”, o for “overseas holiday”, k for “kitchen redecora-
tion” and l for “loan”. Then ¬(d ∧ o) means that it is impossible to have both
domestic holiday and overseas holiday. The statement (c ∧ o) → l says that if
they want to buy a new car and also have an overseas holiday, they have to get
a loan from the bank.
With the above symbolization, we can express the husband’s demands in the
following set:
X1 = {c,d,¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l}
Similarly, the wife’s demands can be represented by:
X2 = {o,k,¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,¬l}
Assume that the husband’s preferences over his demands are:
¬(d ∧ o) ≈1 (c ∧ o) → l  1 c  1 d
and the wife’s preferences are:
¬(d ∧ o) ≈2 (c ∧ o) → l  2 o  2 k  2 ¬l
Let G represent the bargaining game. It is easy to calculate that the game
has the following three possible deals:
D1 =( {¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,c,d},{¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,k,¬l}).
D2 =( {¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,c},{¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,o,k}).
D3 =( {¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l},{¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,o,k,¬l}).
The core of the game is then:
({¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,c},{¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,o})36 D. Zhang
γ(G) contains only a single deal, which is D2. The solution is then
F(G)=D2 =( {¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,c},{¬(d ∧ o),(c ∧ o) → l,o,k})
In words, the couple agree upon the commonsense that they can only have one
holiday and they have to get a loan if they want to buy a new car and to go
overseas for holiday. The husband accepts his wife’s suggestion to have holiday
in Europe and the wife agrees on buying a new car. As a consequence of the
agreement, they agree on getting a loan to buy the car.
3 Fixed Point Property
In [11], it was argued that a procedure of negotiation can be viewed as a course of
mutual belief revision when players’ belief states with respect to the negotiation
are speciﬁed by the demand sets of the bargaining game.
Before we show the ﬁxed-point property of the solution we construct, let us
consider two facts on the solution:
Lemma 2. πG
max =m a x {k : X
≤k
1 ∪ X
≤k
2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent}.
Proof. Let π =m a x {k : X
≤k
1 ∪ X
≤k
2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent}.I ti se a s yt o
show that X
≤π
G
max
1 ∪ X
≤π
G
max
2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent because γ(G)i sn o n -
empty. Therefore πG
max ≤ π. On the other hand, since X
≤π
1 ∪ X
≤π
2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2)
is consistent, there exists a deal (D1,D 2) ∈ Ω(G) such that X
≤π
i ⊆ Di and
X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ Di for each i =1 ,2. Thus π ≤ πG
max. We conclude that π = πG
max.
Lemma 3. Given a bargaining game G, for any deal D ∈ Ω(G),
D ∈ γ(G) iﬀ Φ1 ⊆ D1 and Φ2 ⊆ D2.
where (Φ1,Φ 2) i st h ec o r eo fG.
Proof. “⇒” Straightforward from the deﬁnition of γ(G).
“⇐” For any deal D ∈ Ω(G), if Φ1 ⊆ D1 and Φ2 ⊆ D2,t h e nf o re a c hi,
X
≤π
G
max
i ⊆ Di. It follows that max{k : X
≤k
1 ⊆ D1 and X
≤k
2 ⊆ D2}≥πG
max.
Therefore max{k : X
≤k
1 ⊆ D1 and X
≤k
2 ⊆ D2} = πG
max.
The above results show an intuitive procedure to construct a bargaining solution.
First calculate the core by going through both parties’s hierarchies of demands
in parallel top-down to the level at which the collective demands are maximally
consistent with the common demands. Then collect all the deals that contain
the core. Finally, calculate the intersection of the deals that contain the core for
each party.
Assume that X1 and X2 are two belief sets (so logically closed), representing
the belief states of two agents. Mutual belief revision between the agents means
that each agent takes part of the other agent’s beliefs to revise his belief set. ForA Fixed-Point Property of Logic-Based Bargaining Solution 37
instance, if Ψ1 is a subset of X1 and Ψ2 is a subset of X2,t h e nX1 ⊗1 Ψ2 is the
revised belief set of player 1 after he accepts player 2’s beliefs Ψ2 while X2⊗2Ψ1 is
the resulting belief set of player 2 after accepting Ψ1. Such an interaction of belief
revision can continue until it reaches a ﬁxed point where the beliefs in common,
(X1 ⊗1Ψ2)∩(X2 ⊗2 Ψ1), are exactly the beliefs that the agents mutually accept,
Ψ1 + Ψ2.T h i sg i v e s
Ψ1 + Ψ2 =( X1 ⊗1 Ψ2) ∩ (X2 ⊗2 Ψ1)( 4 )
Suppose that the belief sets, X1 and X2, represent the two agents’ demands,
respectively. Then (X1 ⊗1 Ψ2) ∩ (X2 ⊗2 Ψ1) should represent the common re-
vised demands after negotiation if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are the agreements that are mu-
tually accepted each other. Therefore any bargaining solution should satisfy the
ﬁxed-point condition (4). The following theorem conﬁrms that the solution we
constructed in this paper satisﬁes the ﬁxed-point condition.
Theorem 1. For any bargaining game G =( ( X1, 1),(X2, 2)),i fX1 and X2
are logically closed, the bargaining solution F(G) satisﬁes the following ﬁxed-
point condition:
F1(G)+F2(G)=( X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) ∩ (X2 ⊗2 F1(G)) (5)
where ⊗i is the prioritized revision operator for player i.
To show this theorem, we need a few technical lemmas.
Lemma 4. For any bargaining game G =( ( X1, 1),(X2, 2)),
1. F1(G) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 F2(G);
2. F2(G) ⊆ X2 ⊗2 F1(G).
Proof. According to the deﬁnition of prioritized base revision, we have X1 ⊗1
F2(G)=

H∈X1⇓F2(G)
Cn(H ∪ F2(G)). For any H ∈ X1 ⇓ F2(G), there is a deal
(D1,D 2) ∈ Ω(G) such that D1 = H. This is because we can extend the pair
(H,F2(G)) to a deal (H,D2) such that F2(G) ⊆ D2. On the other hand, since
Φ1∪F2(G) is consistent, we have Φ1 ⊆ H,w h e r e( Φ1,Φ 2)i st h ec o r eo fG.T h u s ,
Φ1 ⊆ D1 and Φ2 ⊆ D2. According to Lemma 3, we have (D1,D 2) ∈ γ(G). Since
F1(G) ⊆ D1,w eh a v eF1(G) ⊆ H. We conclude that F1(G) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 F2(G). The
proof of the second statement is similar.
By this lemma we have,
1. F1(G)+F2(G) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 F2(G);
2. F1(G)+F2(G) ⊆ X2 ⊗2 F1(G).
Note that the above lemma does not require the demand sets X1 and X2 to be
logically closed. However, the following lemmas do.
Lemma 5. Let (Φ1,Φ 2) be the core of game G =( ( X1, 1),(X2, 2)).I fX1
and X2 are logically closed, then38 D. Zhang
1. X1 ⊗1 F2(G)=X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2));
2. X2 ⊗2 F1(G)=X2 ⊗2 (Φ1 +( X1 ∩ X2))
Proof. We only present the proof of the ﬁrst statement. The second one is sim-
ilar. Firstly, we prove that F2(G) ⊆ Φ1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2). If X1 ∪ X2 is con-
sistent, the result is obviously true. Therefore we can assume that X1 ∪ X2 is
inconsistent.
Assume that ϕ ∈ F2(G). If ϕ  ∈ Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2), we have {¬ϕ}∪Φ1∪Φ2∪
(X1∩X2) is consistent. According to Lemma 2, we have X
≤π
G
max+1
1 ∪X
≤π
G
max+1
2 ∪
(X1 ∩ X2) is inconsistent. Since our language is ﬁnite and both X1 and X2 are
logically closed, the sets X1∩X2, X
≤π
G
max+1
1 and X
≤π
G
max+1
2 are all logically closed
(the latter two due to LC). Therefore each set has a ﬁnite axiomatization. Let
sentence ψ0 axiomatize X1 ∩ X2, ψ1 axiomatize X
≤π
G
max+1
1 and ψ2 axiomatize
X
≤π
G
max+1
2 .T h u sψ0 ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is inconsistent. Notice that ψ0 ∧ ψ1 ∈ X1 and
ψ0∧ψ2 ∈ X2. It follows that ¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ1) ∈ X1 and ¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ2) ∈ X2.S i n c e
{¬ϕ}∪Φ1∪Φ2∪(X1∩X2) is consistent, there is a deal (D1,D 2) ∈ γ(G) such that
{¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ1)}∪Φ1∪(X1∩X2) ⊆ D1 and {¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ2)}∪Φ2∪(X1∩X2) ⊆ D2.
We know that ϕ ∈ F2(G), so ϕ ∈ D1 +D2.T h u sψ0 ∧ψ1 ∧ψ2 ∈ D1 +D2,w h i c h
contradicts the fact that D1 + D2 is consistent. Therefore, we have shown that
F2(G) ⊆ Φ1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2).
Now we prove that X1 ⊗1 F2(G)=X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +(X1 ∩X2)). By Lemma 4, we
have Φ1+Φ2 ⊆ X1⊗1F2(G). It follows that X1⊗1F2(G)=( X1⊗1F2(G))+(Φ1+
Φ2). Furthermore, we yield X1⊗1F2(G)=( X1⊗1F2(G))+(Φ1+Φ2)+(X1∩X2)
because X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ F2(G). Since F2(G) ⊆ Φ1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2). According
to the AGM postulates, we have (X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) + (Φ1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)) =
X1⊗1(Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2)). Therefore X1⊗2F2(G)=X1⊗1(Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2)).
In addition, it is easy to prove that Φ1 ⊆ X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)). By the AGM
postulates again, we have X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩X2)) = (X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +(X1 ∩X2))+
Φ1 = X1 ⊗1 (Φ1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)). Therefore X1 ⊗1 F2(G)=X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +
(X1 ∩ X2)).
The following lemma will complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 6. If X1 and X2 are logically closed, then
(X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) ∩ (X2 ⊗2 F1(G)) ⊆ F1(G)+F2(G).
Proof. et
Φ 
1 = X
≤π
1
max
1 ,w h e r eπ1
max =m a x {k : X
≤k
1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2)i sc o n s i s t e n t }
and
Φ 
2 = X
≤π
2
max
2 ,w h e r eπ2
max =m a x {k : Φ1 ∪ X
≤k
2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent},
where (Φ1,Φ 2)i st h ec o r eo fG.
Note that in the cases when πi
max does not exist, we simply assume that it
equals to +∞. We claim that X1 ⊗1 F2(G)=Φ 
1 + F2(G)a n dX2 ⊗2 F1(G)=
Φ 
2 + F1(G). We shall provide the proof of the ﬁrst statement. The second one
is similar.A Fixed-Point Property of Logic-Based Bargaining Solution 39
Firstly, according to Lemma 2, Φ1 ⊆ Φ 
1. Secondly, by Lemma 5, we have
X1 ⊗1 F2(G)=X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)). Therefore to show X1 ⊗1 F2(G)=
Φ 
1 + F2(G), we only need to prove that X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)) = Φ 
1 + Φ2 +
(X1 ∩ X2). This is because Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2) ⊆ F2(G), F2(G) ⊆ Φ1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩
X2)a n dΦ1 ⊆ Φ 
1. By the construction of prioritized revision, we can easily
verify that Φ 
1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)). Therefore we only
have to show the other direction, i.e., X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)) ⊆ Φ 
1 + Φ2 +
(X1 ∩ X2).
If Φ 
1 = X1,t h e nX1 ∪ (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)) is consistent. It follows that X1 ⊗1
(Φ2 +(X1 ∩X2)) ⊆ X1 +(Φ2 +(X1 ∩X2)) = Φ 
1 +Φ2 +(X1 ∩X2), as desired. If
Φ 
1  = X1, according to the deﬁnition of π1
max,w eh a v eX
≤π
1
max+1
1 ∪Φ2∪(X1∩X2)
is inconsistent. Therefore there exists ψ ∈ X
≤π
1
max+1
1 such that ¬ψ ∈ Φ2 +(X1∩
X2). Now we assume that ϕ ∈ X1⊗1(Φ2+(X1∩X2)). If ϕ  ∈ Φ 
1+Φ2+(X1∩X2),
then {¬ϕ}∪Φ 
1∪Φ2∪(X1∩X2) is consistent. So is {¬ϕ∨ψ}∪Φ 
1∪Φ2∪(X1∩X2).
Notice that ¬ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ X
≤π
1
max+1
1 .T h e r ee x i s t sH ∈ X1 ⇓ (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)) such
that {¬ϕ ∨ ψ}∪Φ 
1 ⊆ H.S i n c eϕ ∈ X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)) and H is logically
closed, we have ψ ∈ H, which contradicts the consistency of H∪(Φ2+(X1∩X2)).
Therefore X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2)) ⊆ Φ 
1 + Φ2 +( X1 ∩ X2).
Finally we prove the claim of the lemma. Let ϕ ∈ (X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) ∩ (X2 ⊗2
F1(G)). We then have ϕ ∈ (Φ 
1 + F2(G)) ∩ (Φ 
1 + F2(G)). For ϕ ∈ Φ 
1 + F2(G),
there exists a sentence ψ2 such that F2(G)   ψ2 and ϕ ∨¬ ψ2 ∈ Φ 
1. Similarly,
there exists a sentence ψ1 such that F1(G)   ψ1 and ϕ ∨¬ ψ1 ∈ Φ 
2. It turns
out that ϕ ∨¬ ψ1 ∨¬ ψ2 ∈ Φ 
1 ∩ Φ 
2.T h u sϕ ∨¬ ψ1 ∨¬ ψ2 ∈ X1 ∩ X2. However,
X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ F1(G)+F2(G). It follows that ϕ ∨¬ ψ1 ∨¬ ψ2 ∈ F1(G)+F2(G).
Note that ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ F1(G)+F2(G). Therefore we conclude that ϕ ∈ F1(G)+
F2(G).
4 Conclusion and Related Work
We have presented a logic-based bargaining solution based on Zhang and Zhang’s
model [12]. We have shown that the solution satisﬁes the ﬁxed-point property,
which asserts that the procedure of negotiation can be viewed as a course of
mutual belief revision. The result is interesting not only because the result itself
presents a desirable logical property of bargaining solutions but also establishes
a link between bargaining and multi-agent belief revision. On the one hand,
eﬀorts have been made to the investigation of multi-agent belief revision [15,16],
the research is far from satisfaction. On the other hand, bargaining have been a
research topic in game theory for a few decades with sophisticated theory and
variety of applications. It is easy to see that all the concepts introduced in this
paper for the two-player bargaining game can be easily extended to the n-player
cases. However, the extension of ﬁxed-point property of mutual belief revision
can be extremely hard. Therefore the link between bargaining and belief revision
could give us a better understanding of multi-agent belief revision and could give
us some hints towards the research.40 D. Zhang
The ﬁxed-point property for negotiation functions was proposed by Zhang et
al. [11]. However, there was no concrete negotiation function is constructed to
satisfy the property. Meyer et al. gave a construction of negotiation function
based on belief revision and discussed their logical properties [9,10]. Zhang and
Zhang presented another belief-revision-based bargaining solution [12,13], which
is similar to ours. However it is not too hard to verify that none of the above
mentioned solutions satisﬁes the ﬁxed-point property. Jin et al. [17] presents a
mutual belief revision function that satisﬁes a ﬁxed-point condition. However,
the construction of the function is deﬁned on belief revision operator and the
ﬁxed-point condition describes totally diﬀerent property, which says that mutual
belief revision is closed under iteration.
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